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Andrew Flavelle Martin*  The Implications of Federalism for the
 Regulation of Federal Government
 Lawyers
The implications of Canadian federalism for the regulation of lawyers for the federal 
government are largely overlooked in the literature and case law. This article 
argues that employees of the federal government can practice law without being 
licensed by the corresponding provincial law society (or any law society). However, 
if they happen to be licensed by a law society, they can be disciplined by that 
law society—unless and until Parliament adopts legislation immunizing them from 
law society discipline. The article also considers the possibility that Parliament 
could create a separate bar for federal government lawyers. It concludes that 
some form of regulatory and disciplinary jurisdiction over federal government 
lawyers is necessary to protect the public interest and public con dence in federal 
government lawyers.
Les implications du fédéralisme canadien sur la réglementation des avocats à 
l’emploi du gouvernement fédéral sont largement négligées dans la littérature 
et la jurisprudence. Dans le présent article, nous soutenons que les employés 
du gouvernement fédéral peuvent pratiquer le droit sans être autorisés par le 
barreau provincial correspondant (ou tout autre barreau). Cependant, s’ils sont 
autorisés par un barreau, ils peuvent être sanctionnés par ce dernier, à moins 
que le législateur n’adopte une loi les immunisant contre la discipline du barreau. 
Dans l’article, nous envisageons également la possibilité que le législateur crée 
un barreau distinct pour les avocats du gouvernement fédéral. Nous concluons 
qu’une certaine forme de compétence réglementaire et disciplinaire à l’égard des 
avocats du gouvernement fédéral est nécessaire pour protéger l’intérêt public et la 
con ance du public dans les avocats à l’emploi du gouvernement fédéral.
* Of the Ontario Bar; Assistant Professor, Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University. Thanks 
to Patricia Neijens and Alexander Corley for research assistance and to Elizabeth Edinger, Hoi Kong, 
Asha Kaushal, and Robin Elliott for comments on a draft.
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Introduction
Canadian federalism has legal implications for the regulation of lawyers 
for the federal government, but these implications are largely overlooked 
in the literature and case law. The federal government is one of the largest, 
if not the largest, legal employers in Canada. It has more than 2500 
lawyers across the country, primarily in the Department of Justice and the 
Public Prosecution Service of Canada.1 Recent literature has assessed the 
jurisdiction of provincial law societies over lawyers in government roles—
1. Almost a decade ago, Adam Dodek wrote that “Canada’s largest law entity is actually the federal 
Department of Justice and not one of the national law  rms…. With over 2,700 lawyers, it is more 
than twice the size of the largest law  rm.” (Adam M Dodek, “Lawyering at the Intersection of Public 
Law and Legal Ethics: Government Lawyers as Custodians of the Rule of Law” (2010) 33:1 Dal LJ 1 
at 4 [citation omitted]). More recently, see e.g. Andrew Flavelle Martin, “Legal Ethics and the Political 
Activity of Government Lawyers” (2018) 49:2 Ottawa L Rev 263 [Martin, “Government Lawyers’ 
Political Activity”] at 303 n 138: “According to  gures from the Association of Justice Counsel, there 
are approximately 2600 lawyers in the federal government” [citation omitted].
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the Attorney General, lawyer-politicians, and government lawyers—
and  examined particular ethical issues facing such lawyers. 2 However, 
this literature has largely focused on lawyers employed by provincial 
governments, and at most has  agged the possibility of federalism 
considerations changing the legal answers for lawyers employed by 
the federal government.3 While some literature and case law addresses 
these implications in passing, there is no determinative let alone in-depth 
analysis of them.  
Regulation of the professions falls under provincial jurisdiction over 
“Property and Civil Rights” in section 92(13) of the Constitution Act, 
1867, and regulation of the legal profession may also fall under “The 
Administration of Justice in the Province” in section 92(14).4 Thus, it 
2. Attorney General: Andrew Flavelle Martin, “The Legal Ethics Implications of the SNC-Lavalin 
Affair for the Attorney General of Canada” (2019) 67:3 Crim LQ 161 [Martin, “SNC-Lavalin”]; 
Andrew Flavelle Martin, “The Immunity of the Attorney General to Law Society Discipline” (2016) 
94:2 Can Bar Rev 413 [Martin, “Attorney General Immunity”]; Brent Cotter, “The Prime Minister v 
the Chief Justice of Canada: The Attorney General’s Failure of Responsibility” (2015) 18 Leg Ethics 
73; Andrew Flavelle Martin, “The Attorney General as Lawyer (?): Con dentiality upon Resignation 
from Cabinet” (2015) 38:1 Dal LJ 147 [Martin, “Attorney General Resignation”]. Lawyer-Politicians: 
Andrew Flavelle Martin, “Legal Ethics versus Political Practices: The Application of the Rules 
of Professional Conduct to Lawyer-Politicians” (2013) 91:1 Can Bar Rev 1 [Martin, “Lawyer-
Politicians”]; Andrew Flavelle Martin, “Consequences for Broken Political Promises: Lawyer-
Politicians and the Rules of Professional Conduct” (2016) 10:2 JPPL 337 [Martin, “Consequences 
for Lawyer-Politicians”]. (I follow here the de nition of lawyer-politicians as politicians who happen 
to be lawyers, i.e., politicians whose of cial functions do not include the practice of law: Martin, 
“Lawyer-Politicians” at 3.) Government lawyers: John Mark Keyes, “Loyalty, Legality and Public 
Sector Lawyers” (2019) 97:1 Can Bar Rev 756 [Keyes, “Loyalty”]; Andrew Flavelle Martin & 
Candice Telfer, “The Impact of the Honour of the Crown on the Ethical Obligations of Government 
Lawyers: A Duty of Honourable Dealing” (2018) 41:2 Dal LJ 443; Martin, “Government Lawyers’ 
Political Activity,” supra note 1; Eric Pierre Boucher, “Civil Crown Counsel: Lore Masters of the 
Rule of Law” (2018) 12 JPPL 463; Elizabeth Sanderson, Government Lawyering: Duties and Ethical 
Challenges of Government Lawyers (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 2018).
3. Martin, “Lawyer Politicians,” supra note 2 at 20 dismisses the potential for law societies to 
discipline federal lawyer-politicians as “merely one of many quirks created by a federal system.” 
Martin, “Attorney General Immunity,” supra note 2 at 444, n 149 raises the possibility that Parliament 
could immunize the Attorney General in federal legislation “in order to protect the proper federal 
jurisdiction over criminal law.” Martin, “Government Lawyers’ Political Activity,” supra note 1 at 
299 notes that federalism considerations might preclude federal legislation on government employees 
from prevailing over provincial legislation on the legal profession. While Keyes, “Loyalty,” supra 
note 2 focuses on federal government lawyers, he makes no mention of federalism. Similarly, while 
Sanderson, supra note 2 focuses more on lawyers for the federal than provincial and territorial 
governments, she focuses little on federalism (other than her proposition for a federal government 
lawyer code and “over-sight regim[e]” at 3-5).
4. Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, Appendix II, No 5; Law 
Society of BC v Mangat, 2001 SCC 67 at paras 38-41 (92(13)), 42-46 (92(14)), [2001] 3 SCR 113 
[Mangat], applied e.g. in Krieger v Law Society of Alberta, 2002 SCC 65 at para 33, [2002] 3 SCR 
372 [Krieger]. Section 92(14) reads in full: “The Administration of Justice in the Province, including 
the Constitution, Maintenance, and Organization of Provincial Courts, both of Civil and of Criminal 
Jurisdiction, and including Procedure in Civil Matters in those Courts.”
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is provincial legislation on the legal profession that de nes the practice 
of law, prohibits the unlicensed practice of law, and delegates to each 
provincial law society the power to regulate the practice of law—including 
the power to prosecute unlawful practice—and the legal profession in the 
public interest.5 Through that legislation or other legislation, provincial 
legislatures can modify the regulation of lawyers for the provincial 
government, such as exempting them from licensing requirements or 
immunizing them from law society jurisdiction.6
While the scope of federal jurisdiction over the legal profession and 
the practice of law is clear in some respects, it is not clear what power 
Parliament has over the regulation of lawyers for the federal government. 
The literature and case law are mixed as to whether federal government 
lawyers are bound by legislation on the legal profession and subject to 
regulation by the law societies. The Supreme Court of Canada in Krieger 
v Law Society of Alberta asserted that law societies have the same 
disciplinary jurisdiction over federal Crown prosecutors as they do over 
provincial Crown prosecutors:
A law society has the jurisdiction to review the conduct of a federal or 
provincial Crown prosecutor to determine whether the prosecutor has 
acted dishonestly or in bad faith in exercising prosecutorial discretion or 
ful lling the disclosure obligations of the Crown. As members of their 
respective law societies, federal Crown prosecutors are subject to the 
same ethical obligations as all other members of the bar and not immune 
to discipline for dishonest or bad faith conduct.7
However, the issue before the Court in Krieger was only whether provincial 
law societies had jurisdiction over provincial Crown prosecutors—an issue 
that raises different federalism concerns—and so this aspect of Krieger 
was obiter.8 (I will re-assess the implications of the ratio and the obiter in 
Krieger below.9)  Importantly for the purposes of this article, the Court did 
5. See e.g. Legal Profession Act, SBC 1998, c 9; Law Society Act, RSO 1990, c L.8; Legal 
Profession Act, SNS 2004, c 28.
6. See e.g. s 13 of the Law Society Act, supra note 5, immunizing the Attorney General from law 
society jurisdiction, discussed e.g. in Martin, “Attorney General Immunity,” supra note 2 at 437.
7. Krieger, supra note 4 at para 56.
8. The Court in Krieger, ibid at paras 33-39 considered, and rejected, the argument that the 
Law Society of Alberta’s rule addressing conduct by prosecutors was ultra vires the province as 
an intrusion into federal jurisdiction over criminal law and criminal procedure in section 91(27) of 
the Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 4 (“The Criminal Law, except the Constitution of Courts of 
Criminal Jurisdiction, but including the Procedure in Criminal Matters.”).
9. See below notes 97 to 99 and corresponding text.
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not consider the issue of whether federal government lawyers can indeed 
be required to be members of law societies.10
In contrast to Krieger, some commentators have asserted or argued 
that federal government lawyers are immune from provincial law society 
regulation. Deborah MacNair has asserted that “there is a … constitutional 
issue concerning jurisdiction over the affairs of federal lawyers, which 
necessitates certain regulatory limitations.”11 She has expanded on this 
assertion elsewhere, in the speci c context of federal lawyers who draft 
legislation, arguing that while “[t]he courts have not considered the speci c 
case of federal lawyers… it is reasonable to conclude that the law society 
does not regulate federal legislative drafters, including their mandate or the 
licensing requirements that apply to them.” 12 (MacNair argues by analogy 
to the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in The Queen in Right of 
Canada v Lefebvre et al, 13 which I will consider below.14) Similarly, John 
Mark Keyes has argued that federal legislation on federal employees 
would prevail over provincial legislation on the legal profession.15
Consider, for example, three scenarios:
1. The Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, licensed 
in Nova Scotia,  agrantly violates his duty to encourage respect for 
the administration of justice by making unsupported allegations of 
improper conduct against the Chief Justice of Canada.16 Can he be 
disciplined by the Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society?
2. A lawyer for the federal Department of Justice, licensed in 
Manitoba, potentially violates his duty of loyalty by seeking a 
declaration that the Minister and the Department are misinterpreting 
key legislation regarding compliance with the Canadian Charter of 
10. As I will discuss below, there is a line of cases holding that they cannot. See below notes 50 to 
68 and corresponding text.
11. Deborah MacNair, “The Role of the Federal Public Sector Lawyer: From Polyester to Silk” 
(2001) 50 UNBLJ 125 at 162. MacNair does not elaborate, but continues to state that “the Department 
[of Justice] does attempt to respect, to the extent that it can, the regulatory authority of the law society.” 
[McNair, “Silk”].
12. Deborah MacNair, “Legislative Drafters: A Discussion of Ethical Standards from a Canadian 
Perspective” (2003) 24:2 Stat L Rev 125 at 134-135 (concluding at 135 that federal legislative drafters 
cannot be required to be lawyers) [MacNair, “Legislative Drafters”].
13. Ibid at 134-135; [1980] 2 FC 199, 32 NR 613 (CA) [Lefebvre cited to FC].
14. See below notes 50 to 56 and accompanying text.
15. John Mark Keyes, “Professional Responsibilities of Legislative Counsel” (2011) 5 JPPL 11 at 
16 [Keyes, “Legislative Counsel”]. Keyes relies on Mangat, supra note 4. This reliance has been 
questioned: Martin, “Government Lawyers’ Political Activity,” supra note 2 at 299-300.
16. See e.g. Cotter, supra note 2, discussing Peter MacKay.
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Rights and Freedoms.17 Can he be disciplined by the Law Society of 
Manitoba?
3. The Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, licensed in 
Ontario, secretly records a conversation in potential violation of the 
rules of professional conduct.18 Can she be disciplined by the Law 
Society of Ontario?
The answers to all three questions are currently unclear because of 
federalism considerations.
This article aims to resolve this uncertainty in the literature and case 
law. It is organized in three parts. In Part I, I set out the necessary legal 
background for my analysis. In Part II, I analyze the implications of 
federalism for the regulation of lawyers for the federal government. Part II 
advances three propositions:
1. Absent a federally-imposed requirement to the contrary, employees of 
the federal government can practice law without being licensed by the 
corresponding provincial law society (or any law society).
2. But if they happen to be licensed by a law society, they can be 
disciplined by that law society.
3. Parliament can immunize federal government lawyers from law 
society regulation, including law society discipline.
In Part III, I consider Elizabeth Sanderson’s intriguing inspiration for a 
separate regulatory regime for federal government lawyers, concluding 
that it warrants serious consideration.
I. Background
In this part I set out the necessary legal background for my analysis by 
identifying the three relevant federalism doctrines and by canvassing 
federal jurisdiction over the practice of law.
1. Federalism doctrines
The question of whether federal government lawyers are subject to 
provincial legislation on the practice of law can potentially engage three 
distinct federalism doctrines—although, as I will demonstrate below in 
17. Schmidt v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 FCA 55, 421 DLR (4th) 530, aff’g 2016 FC 269, 
[2016] 3 FCR 477 [Schmidt FC], leave to appeal to SCC denied 4 April 2019 (38179); Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada 
Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter]. See Keyes, “Loyalty,” supra note 2; Andrew Flavelle Martin, 
“Folk Hero or Legal Pariah? A Comment on the Legal Ethics of Edgar Schmidt and Schmidt v Canada 
(Attorney General)” (2020) Man LJ [forthcoming].
18. Jamie Strashin, “Wilson-Raybould may not have broken the law, but her Wernick tape crossed 
ethical lines, lawyers say” CBC News (3 April 2019), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/politics/wilson-
raybould-tape-1.5082119> [https://perma.cc/8648-6SY7], discussing Jody Wilson-Raybould. See also 
Martin, “SNC-Lavalin,” supra note 2.
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Part II, it is not always clear which of these three doctrines courts are 
applying. Here I provide a brief introduction to the three.
One doctrine, and indeed the one that I will argue is the most appropriate 
to apply, is paramountcy. Where both a federal law and a provincial law 
are validly enacted under corresponding heads of power, and there is 
an inconsistency between them, the provincial law is “inoperative” (but 
only to the extent of that inconsistency) and the federal law prevails. 19
Most important for the purposes of this article is that there will be an 
inconsistency where compliance with both laws is impossible or the 
provincial law frustrates the federal law’s purpose. 20
A second doctrine is interjurisdictional immunity. Under 
interjurisdictional immunity, a law that “impairs” the “core” of one of 
the other government’s heads of power is “inapplicable” to the extent of 
such impairment.21  Unlike paramountcy, interjurisdictional immunity 
is engaged even when that other level of government has not exercised 
that core power through legislation.22 The Supreme Court of Canada in 
Canadian Western Bank v Alberta was explicit that interjurisdictional 
immunity should be applied only where paramountcy does not provide an 
answer.23
A third doctrine is the immunity of the federal Crown from provincial 
statutes. Under this immunity, provincial legislation does not “bind” the 
federal Crown: “a Provincial Legislature cannot in the valid exercise 
of its legislative power, embrace the Crown in right of Canada in any 
compulsory regulation.”24 However, the Crown may incur or bring itself 
into coverage of the law: “[t]his does not mean that the federal Crown may 
not  nd itself subject to provincial legislation where it seeks to take the 
19. See e.g. Peter W Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed supp (Toronto: Thomson Reuters 
Canada, 2017), vol 1 (loose-leaf revision 2017-1), ch 16 at 16.1, pages 16-2 to 16-3; ch 15 at 15.8(a), 
page 15-28 (quotation is from page 15-28).
20. See e.g. Canadian Western Bank v Alberta, 2007 SCC 22 at para 73, [2007] 2 SCR 3 [Canadian 
Western Bank]; Hogg, supra note 19, ch 16 at 16.3(a), page 16-4; 16.3(b), page 16-10.1.
21. Canadian Western Bank, supra note 20 at para 48 (“impairs” and “core”); Hogg, supra note 19, 
ch 15 at 15.8(a), page 15-28 (“inapplicable”).
22. See e.g. Hogg, supra note 19, ch 15 at 15.8(c), page 15-35. See also Canadian Western Bank v 
Alberta, supra note 20 at para 34: “If that authority is truly exclusive, the reasoning goes, it cannot be 
invaded by provincial legislation even if the federal power remains unexercised.”
23. Canadian Western Bank, supra note 20 at paras 77-78. See also para 33: “Interjurisdictional 
immunity is a doctrine of limited application.”
24. Her Majesty in right of the Province of Alberta v Canadian Transport Commission, [1978] 1 
SCR 61 at 72, 75 DLR (3d) 257; see e.g. Hogg, supra note 19, ch 10 at 10.9(c), (d), pages 10-19 to 
10-21.
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bene t thereof.” 25 Whereas interjurisdictional immunity is “[i]n theory… 
reciprocal” or symmetrical,26 federal Crown immunity is not.27 I note here 
that this constitutional doctrine of federal Crown immunity is distinct from 
the statutory interpretation issue of whether a provincial statute binds the 
federal Crown.28 
Crown immunity, including federal Crown immunity, does not always 
apply to Crown agents, but only where there is “prejudice” to the Crown:
The courts have been properly cautious in extending to individual Crown 
servants the Crown’s immunity from statute law. The mere fact that a 
Crown servant is acting in the course of employment will not entitle the 
servant to the Crown’s immunity. The Crown servant will be entitled to 
immunity only if it can be established that compliance with the statute 
would prejudice the Crown. 29
Moreover, Peter Hogg argues that the existence and correctness of this 
federal Crown immunity as a constitutional doctrine is unclear and that 
“where the federal Crown is engaging in activity which is regulated by 
provincial law, it should be bound by the law.”30 
2. Federal jurisdiction over the practice of law
While the provinces have legislative authority over lawyers and the practice 
of law under section 92(13) and perhaps section 92(14) of the Constitution 
Act, 1867, this does not preclude some federal jurisdiction over lawyers 
and the practice of law under the federal heads of power. Parliament can 
allow the unlicensed practice of law in three kinds of contexts: federal 
boards and tribunals, provincial courts in areas of federal jurisdiction, and 
federal courts.
25. Her Majesty in right of the Province of Alberta v Canadian Transport Commission, supra note 
24 at 72. See more recently World Bank Group v Wallace, 2016 SCC 15 at para 97, [2016] 1 SCR 
207: “The “bene t/burden” principle is a common law exception to the Crown’s presumed immunity 
from statute, which applies when the Crown accepts a statutory bene t that has a suf cient nexus 
with an attendant burden. The exception is intended to prevent the Crown from simultaneously taking 
advantage of rights conferred by legislation while invoking its own immunity to shield itself from 
related liabilities or restrictions.”
26. Canadian Western Bank, supra note 20 at para 35.
27. See e.g. Hogg, supra note 19, ch 10 at 10.9(f), page 10-22.
28. Ibid, ch 10 at 10.9 (a), (b), pages 10-18 to 10-19. See also Peter W Hogg, Patrick J Monahan & 
Wade K Wright, Liability of the Crown, 4th ed (Toronto: Thomson Reuters Canada, 2011) at 451: “a 
constitutional question lurks in the background of the interpretative question.”
29. Hogg, Monahan & Wright, supra note 28 at 446. The same text in the third edition was quoted 
with approval in Breton c Comité de discipline de l’Ordre professionnel des travailleurs sociaux du 
Québec, 2005 QCCA 195 at para 22, [2005] RJQ 432 [Breton]. Thank you to a reviewer for bringing 
Breton to my attention.
30. Hogg, supra note 19, ch 10 at 10.9(d), pages 10-20 to 10-21.
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The Supreme Court of Canada in Mangat held that Parliament can 
allow non-lawyers to appear before the Immigration and Refugee Board, 
and provide related services, even though such appearances constitute the 
unlicensed practice of law under provincial legislation, under its power 
over “naturalization and aliens” under section 91(25) of the Constitution 
Act:
Flowing from this jurisdiction over aliens and naturalization is the 
authority to establish a tribunal to determine immigration rights in 
individual cases as part of the administration of these rights. Also  owing 
from this jurisdiction is the authority to provide for the powers of such a 
tribunal and its procedure including that of appearance before it.31
At the same time, “representation before a tribunal has as its object the 
determination of legal rights. It falls within the scope of legal representation 
and the practice of law” and thus provincial jurisdiction.32 That is, 
“Parliament must be allowed to determine who may appear before the 
tribunals it has created, and the provinces must be allowed to regulate the 
practice of law as they have always done.”33 Justice Gonthier for the Court 
held that there was “an operational con ict” between the federal law and 
the provincial legislation, because Parliament “was pursuing the legitimate 
objective of establishing an informal, accessible (in  nancial, cultural, 
and linguistic terms), and expeditious process, peculiar to administrative 
tribunals”—and dual compliance, while technically possible, “would go 
contrary to Parliament’s purpose.”34 That is, “it is impossible to comply 
with the provincial statute without frustrating Parliament’s purpose.”35
(The Supreme Court of Canada has subsequently clari ed that the branch 
31. Mangat, supra note 4 at para 34.
32. Ibid at para 38.
33. Ibid at para 50 [emphasis added].
34. Ibid at para 72.
35. Ibid at para 73
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of paramountcy engaged in Mangat was frustration of purpose, not 
operational con ict.36)
While the decision in Mangat concerned only the Immigration and 
Refugee Board, it would apply to federal tribunals more broadly, so long 
as those tribunals were validly created under a federal head of power. 
Justice Gonthier noted that “[m]any federal tribunals allow representation 
by counsel other than barristers or solicitors” and that Parliament’s 
objective regarding those tribunals was similar to the speci c objective in 
Mangat: “[r]epresentation by non-lawyers is consistent with the purpose 
of such administrative bodies, which is to facilitate access and decrease 
the formality of these bodies as well as to acknowledge the expertise of 
other classes of people.”37 Although the question was not squarely raised 
in Mangat, Mangat appears to recognize that Parliament can also allow 
the federal government to be represented before federal tribunals by non-
lawyers.38
The second context in which Parliament can allow the unlicensed 
practice of law is before provincial courts in matters under federal 
jurisdiction. The best example here is the Criminal Code provisions 
allowing a non-lawyer agent to appear in summary conviction proceedings, 
which were held intra vires Parliament in R v Romanowicz as criminal 
36. See e.g. Saskatchewan (Attorney General) v Lemare Lake Logging Ltd, 2015 SCC 53 at para 
19, [2015] 3 SCR 419 [citation omitted]: “Under the second branch of the paramountcy analysis, 
provincial legislation will be found to be inoperative when it frustrates the purpose of a federal law…. 
In Law Society of British Columbia v. Mangat, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 113, for example, this Court held 
that provincial legislation prohibiting non-lawyers from practising law for a fee before a tribunal, 
con icted with federal legislation providing that a non-lawyer could represent a party before the 
Immigration and Refugee Board, even for a fee. Acknowledging that dual compliance was not 
strictly impossible because a person could either join the Law Society or not charge a fee, the Court 
nonetheless found the provincial law to be ‘contrary to Parliament’s purpose’: para. 72.” See also e.g. 
Alberta (Attorney General) v Moloney, 2015 SCC 51 at para 26, [2015] 3 SCR 327: “The application 
of a more restrictive provincial law may, however, frustrate the federal purpose if the federal law, 
instead of being merely permissive, provides for a positive entitlement.” See also Côté J at para 120, 
dissenting but not on this point [citations omitted]: “In my view, the Court actually found in that 
case [Mangat] that there was no operational con ict (as that concept is understood today), as it noted 
in the above passage that the statutes at issue allowed dual compliance at a ‘super cial level’; the 
words ‘super cial level’ corresponded to the operational con ict branch. And it then found that dual 
compliance was not possible on the basis of an ‘expanded interpretation,’ …; the words ‘expanded 
interpretation’ referred to the frustration of purpose branch.”
37. Mangat, supra note 4 at para 58.
38. Ibid at para 30: “The of cers who appear on behalf of the Minister…are not required to be 
lawyers or have any legal training.”
The Implications of Federalism for the Regulation 373
of Federal Government Lawyers
procedure under 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 1867. 39 While the Court 
in Romanowicz did not engage in a paramountcy analysis—apparently 
because the Law Society Act prohibited unlicensed practice “except 
as provided by law,” and a valid federal law quali ed as “provided by 
law”40—the Criminal Code would prevail over the provincial legislation 
on the legal profession via paramountcy.
Admittedly, Romanowicz and Mangat both become less clear after 
R v Toutissani.41 Romanowicz and Mangat suggest that, if provincial 
legislation prohibited non-lawyers from appearing in summary conviction 
matters, the Criminal Code provisions allowing non-lawyers to appear 
would prevail via paramountcy, and speci cally frustration of purpose. 
Toutissani holds that the provincial legislatures can impose additional 
quali cations on non-lawyer agents despite the Code provisions. There 
is no con ict, because the prospective agent “can become licensed under 
the provincial law,” and because “parliament’s purpose in permitting 
defendants on summary conviction matters to be represented by non-
lawyers is furthered”—not impaired—“by  the provincial legislation.”42
While Casey Prov Ct J in Toutissani purported to distinguish Mangat, he is, 
with respect, unconvincing.43 If the goal is to allow representation by non-
lawyers, which will presumably be more accessible than representation 
by lawyers as was the case in Mangat, a parallel system of requirements 
runs the risk of making these non-lawyers subject to the kinds of costs 
that make non-lawyers attractive in the  rst place—i.e.. frustrating the 
purpose of allowing representation by non-lawyers. Thus Toutissani, as a 
provincial court decision, ultimately seems inconsistent with the decisions 
in Romanowicz and Mangat that were binding on Casey Prov Ct J. 
The third context in which Parliament can allow the unlicensed 
practice of law is before federal courts created under section 101 of the 
Constitution Act, 1867. The power to create these courts would necessarily 
include the power to govern the right of appearance before them. The 
Federal Courts Act and the Supreme Court Act allow those who are 
39. R v Romanowicz (1999), 45 OR (3d) 506 at paras 15-20, 178 DLR (4th) 466 (CA), Carthy, 
Doherty & Laskin JJA. This is not the only example. A non-lawyer trustee performing functions under 
the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985, c B-3 for a fee is not illegally practicing law, as that Act 
prevails over provincial legislation on the practice of law via the doctrine of paramountcy: Barreau du 
Quebec c Marcoux, [1988] RJQ 1457.
40. Romanowicz, supra note 39 at para 23.
41. R v Toutissani, 2008 ONCJ 139, [2008] OJ No 1174 (QL).
42. Ibid at paras 27, 30.
43. In fairness to Casey Prov Ct J, the court in Romanowicz, supra note 39 at para 88, opened 
the door for Toutissani when it observed that “[u]nregulated representation by agents who are not 
required to have any particular training or ability in complex and dif cult criminal proceedings where 
a person’s liberty and livelihood are at stake invites miscarriages of justice.”
374 The Dalhousie Law Journal
“barristers or advocates in a province” or “attorneys or solicitors of the 
superior courts in a province” to practice in those roles before the Federal 
Court, the Federal Court of Appeal, and the Supreme Court of Canada.44
The Tax Court of Canada Act is to similar effect. 45 But the Court Martial 
Appeal Court Rules go further, recognizing as counsel not only those 
“entitled by law to practise as barristers or advocates in any province 
or territory of Canada” but also those who are “assigned to practise in 
the Court by the Judge Advocate General.”46 The Tax Court of Canada 
Act also allows appearances by non-lawyer agents for “all parties”—not 
just the taxpayer—under  its informal procedure.47 Again, to the extent 
that these federal statutes are inconsistent with legislation on the legal 
profession, they would prevail via paramountcy.48
II. The implications of federalism for the regulation of lawyers for the 
federal government
In this part, I analyze the implications of federalism for the regulation 
of lawyers for the federal government. I set out and advance three 
consecutive propositions. The  rst proposition is that employees of 
the federal government can practice law without being licensed by the 
corresponding provincial law society (or any law society), absent a 
federally-imposed requirement to the contrary. The second proposition is 
that if federal government lawyers nonetheless happen to be licensed by 
a law society, they can be disciplined by that law society. And the third 
proposition is that Parliament can immunize federal government lawyers 
from law society discipline.
1. Federal government “lawyers” can practice without being licensed 
by a law society
I  rst argue that employees of the federal government can practice law 
without being licensed by a law society. There is a line of cases holding 
that employees of the federal government can practice professions 
without being licensed or otherwise complying with provincial legislation 
governing those professions. While these cases do not address lawyers 
44. Supreme Court Act, RSC 1985, c S-26, ss 22-23; Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7, ss 11(1), 
(2).
45. Tax Court of Canada Act, RSC 1985, c T-2, s 17.1(2): “Every person who may practise as a 
barrister, advocate, attorney or solicitor in any of the provinces may so practise in the Court and is an 
of cer of the Court.”
46. Court Martial Appeal Court Rules, SOR/86-959, made under s 244(1) of the National Defence 
Act, RSC 1985, c N-5, r 19(2).
47. Tax Court of Canada Act, supra note 45, ss 18, 18.14.
48. Since legal of cers in the Canadian Forces are servants of the federal Crown, the appearance 
rights in the Court Martial Appeal Court Rules might also prevail via federal Crown immunity.
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speci cally,49 the same reasoning would appear to apply to lawyers—
except perhaps for an argument around independence of the bar. However, 
courts may exercise their inherent jurisdiction to refuse to allow non-
lawyers to appear before them.
In Lefebvre, the Federal Court of Appeal held that a federal government 
employee could engage in what would otherwise be the provincially 
regulated profession of chemists without complying with corresponding 
provincial legislation, because the provinces cannot interfere with the 
federal government’s choice of personnel:
the statutes adopted by a provincial legislature cannot limit the power 
enjoyed by the federal government to choose whomever it will to 
perform the administrative functions falling within its jurisdiction…. The 
performance by the federal government of the administrative functions 
pertaining to it requires that there be a federal Public Service. The power 
to regulate hiring of its employees, like that of regulating their working 
conditions, seems to me to belong exclusively to the federal Parliament. 
It is for this reason that, in my opinion, statutes such as the Professional 
Code and the Professional Chemists Act cannot be applied to federal 
employees on account of acts which they perform in the course of their 
duties. If that were not so, it would amount to saying that each of the ten 
provinces could establish as it saw  t the standards of competence that 
the federal government should meet in hiring its personnel. 50
Note here the speci c language that these provincial statutes cannot “apply” 
to federal employees—which  suggests the doctrine of interjurisdictional 
immunity, although Pratt JA never mentions that doctrine by name. In 
drawing an analogy to the power “of regulating their [federal employees’] 
working conditions,” Pratt JA cites Reference re Minimum Wage Act 
(Saskatchewan).51 In that case, the Supreme Court of Canada held that 
provincial minimum wage legislation could not apply to federal servants.52
While Pratt JA does not cite a federal head of power for the hiring and 
regulating of federal employees, it is best identi ed as 91(8).53 
I note here that while it is not entirely clear from the text of Reference 
re Minimum Wage Act which doctrine the court was applying, and thus 
the doctrine for which Pratt JA followed the case, the Supreme Court of 
49. As I will discuss below, one case does involve students-at-law. See below note 61 and 
accompanying text.
50. Lefebvre, supra note 13 at 203-204. 
51. [1948] SCR 248, [1948] 3 DLR 801 [Reference re Minimum Wage Act cited to SCR].
52. Ibid.
53. Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 4, s 91(8): “The  xing of and providing for the Salaries and 
Allowances of Civil and other Of cers of the Government of Canada.” See below notes 67 and 68 and 
accompanying text.
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Canada subsequently con rmed in Bell Canada v Quebec (Commission de 
la Santé et de la Sécurité du Travail) that Reference re Minimum Wage Act 
was an example of interjurisdictional immunity.54
Another complication in understanding and applying Lefebvre at 
present is that the Supreme Court of Canada in Canadian Western Bank 
narrowed interjurisdictional immunity, holding that the doctrine only 
applies where the challenged statute “impairs,” not merely “affects,” the 
relevant head of power: “[t]he difference between “affects” and “impairs” 
is that the former does not imply any adverse consequence whereas the 
latter does.”55 However, the language of Pratt JA appears to meet the 
threshold of impairment. The adverse consequence is that the federal 
government cannot freely choose and regulate its own employees, which 
essentially defeats section 91(8).
Lefebvre was not a case about a prosecution for unlicensed practice, 
but instead an appeal from the adjudication of a public service grievance. 
The respondents had sought reimbursement for the professional fees they 
paid to the Order of Chemists of Quebec, under a term of the collective 
agreement that provided that professional fees would be reimbursed 
“when the payment of such fees is a requirement for the continuation of 
the performance of the duties of his position.” 56 The employer lost the 
grievance but prevailed on appeal. 
This point of Lefebvre has been followed in several grievance 
adjudications: nurses in Manitoba57; engineers in British Columbia58; and 
nurses in Quebec.59 However, other decisions have noted that compliance 
with legislation is required, and thus fees must be reimbursed, where 
membership is a requirement of federal, not provincial, legislation—
such as for veterinarians whose duties involve functions for which the 
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and the Food and Drugs Act require 
54. Bell Canada v Quebec (Commission de la Santé et de la Sécurité du Travail), [1988] 1 SCR 74 
at 762, 51 DLR (4th) 161.
55. Canadian Western Bank, supra note 20 at para 48.
56. Lefebvre, supra note 13 at 200-201.
57. Chorney v Canada (Treasury Board – Solicitor General), 1985 CarswellNat 941 at para 17, 
[1985] CPSSRB No 101 (QL).
58. Churcher and Treasury Board (Transport Canada), 1991 CarswellNat 2141, [1991] CPSSRB 
No 115 (QL).
59. Barbas and Treasury Board (Veterans Affairs Canada), 1989 CarswellNat 1910, [1989] CPSSRB 
No 111 (QL); Dagenais and Treasury Board (Department of Veterans Affairs), 1987 CarswellNat 
1575, [1987] CPSSRB No 160 (QL).
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a provincial licence.60 Similarly, membership is required, and thus fees 
must be reimbursed, where membership is a condition of employment. 61
Lefebvre was followed by the Quebec Superior Court in Corporation 
professionnelle des médecins vétérinaires du Québec c Hardy—a  case 
squarely about the unauthorized practice of a self-regulated profession.62
Hardy, an employee of the federal government, had practiced veterinary 
medicine in the course of meat inspection in Quebec without being on the 
roll of l’Ordre des Médicins-Vétérinaires.63 Justice Martineau held that the 
relevant legislation could not bind the federal Crown:
Il est évident que les provinces ont toutes la compétence législative 
nécessaire pour régir l’exercice de leur pouvoir. Cependant, en examinant 
l’arrêt Lefebvre cité plus haut, et plusieurs autres, dans la même veine, 
il est tout autant évident que la Couronne Fédérale n’est pas liée par les 
Lois Provinciales en cause, soit celle sur les médecins-vétérinaires, ainsi 
que sur le Code des professions. 64
Justice Martineau continues in language similar to Lefebvre (before 
explicitly adopting the language in Lefebvre), and speci cally cites federal 
legislation that is to govern these matters:
…  Si l’on devait régir les préposés de la Couronne Fédérale par la 
législation provinciale, ou une portion d’icelle une telle exigence 
imposerait un nombre de contraintes importances à l’exercice par 
l’administration fédérale des pouvoirs de gérance qui lui sont dévolus 
par la loi.
La Couronne Fédérale a légiféré en adoptant entre autres la loi sur 
l’emploi dans la fonction publique, S.R.C. 1970, c. P-32 et la loi sur 
60. Katchin v Canadian Food Inspection Agency, 2004 PSSRB 26 at paras 53 and 55, 2004 
CarswellNat 952, [2004] CPSSRB No 25 (QL); Harper v Canadian Food Inspection Agency, 2002 
PSSRB 87 at paras 53-54, 92, 2002 CarswellNat 5746, [2002] CPSSRB No 70 (QL); Controlled 
Drugs and Substances Act, SC 1996, c 19; Food and Drugs Act, RSC 1985, c F-27.
61. Association of Justice Counsel v Treasury Board, 2015 PSLREB 23 at para 49, 2015 CarswellNat 
781. Oddly, the government in the agreed statement of facts at para 4 conceded that “13. Law Society 
statutes (regulations/ policies) state that anyone performing the duties of an articling student must be 
registered with the law society in their jurisdiction (as an articling student, student-at-law, or whatever 
other title is used by the law society in that jurisdiction). As such, articling students employed at the 
Department of Justice are required to be registered by the law society in that jurisdiction.” And that 
“14. All articling students are governed by the law societies in their jurisdiction, including being bound 
by the professional codes of conduct in those jurisdictions.” I proceed on the basis that this concession 
in a single grievance adjudication, while odd and unwise, does not bind the federal government.
62. [1986] JQ no 2357 (QL) [Hardy].
63. Ibid at paras 7-8.
64. Ibid at para 19. An unof cial translation is as follows: “It is clear that the provinces all have the 
necessary legislative competence to govern the exercise of their powers. However, in examining the 
Lefebvre judgement cited above, and others in the same vein, it is just as clear that the Federal Crown 
is not bound by the Provincial laws in question, be it the one on veterinary surgeons, as well as the 
Professional Code.”
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l’administration  nancière, S.R.C., 1970, c. F-10, pour mettre sur pied les 
cadres, les préposés et les employés ainsi que l’infra-structure nécessaire 
à la réalisation de ses objectifs, entre autre, seule la Couronne Fédérale 
peut déterminer et, de fait, a déterminé par ses lois, les préposés ou autres 
employés dont elle a besoin pour assurer une saine administration.
Appliquer la Loi Provinciale ou de la Couronne aux droits de la Province 
dans le choix de ces personnes seraient imposer une grande entrave aux 
droits, privilèges et prérogatives de la Couronne aux droits du Canada.
Établir des critères d’admissibilité et des conditions d’emploi 
dans la fonction publique fédérale constitue un aspect essentiel de 
l’administration de la fonction publique et de sa régie interne. Soumettre 
l’exercice de tel pouvoir à une legislation provinciale constituerait une 
intrusion qui aurait comme effet, de priver l’autorité fédérale de l’une de 
ses compétences essentielles. 65
Justice Martineau also relied on Canada (Attorney General) v St Hubert 
Base Teachers’ Assn, 66 in which the Supreme Court of Canada quoted 
approvingly from André Tremblay’s conclusion that subsection 91(8) of 
the Constitution Act, 1867 grants power beyond its explicit content of 
“The  xing of and providing for the Salaries and Allowances of Civil and 
other Of cers of the Government of Canada”67: “L’article 91(8) permet de 
penser que c’était vraiment l’intention des hommes de 1867 de con er au 
Dominion la réglementation totale des rapports entre la Couronne fédérale 
et ses employés.” 68 St Hubert Base, like Reference re Minimum Wage Act 
65. Ibid at paras 39-42. An unof cial translation is as follows: 
“If we had to govern the of cers of the federal Crown through provincial legislation, or a 
portion thereof, such a demand would impose a number of important restraints to the federal 
administration’s exercise of governing powers conferred to it by the law. 
 The Federal Crown legislated by adopting, among others, the Public Service Employment Act, 
RSC 1970, c P-32, and the Financial Administration Act, RSC 1970, c F-10, to establish the managers, 
of cers, and employees, as well as the infrastructure necessary to accomplish its objectives, among 
others, only the Federal Crown can determine and as such, has determined through its laws, the of cers 
and other employees that it needs to ensure sound administration. 
 Applying the provincial law or the law of the provincial Crown in the choice of these people 
would impose a great impediment to the rights, privileges, and prerogatives of the Federal Crown. 
 Establishing admission criteria and employment requirements in the federal public service 
constitutes an essential aspect of public service administration and its internal management. Subjecting 
the exercise of such a power to a provincial legislature would constitute an intrusion which would have 
the effect of depriving the federal authority of one of its core competences.”
66. [1983] 1 SCR 498, 1 DLR (4th) 105 [St Hubert Base cited to SCR].
67. Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 4.
68. St Hubert Base, supra note 66 at 507, quoting from André Tremblay, Les Compétences 
législatives au Canada et les Pouvoirs provinciaux en Matière de Propriété et de Droits civils (Ottawa: 
l’Université d’Ottawa, 1967) at 239, n 461, which is quoted in Hardy, supra note 62 at para 37. The 
of cial English translation from the SCR is as follows: “Section 91(8) suggests that it was really the 
intent of the statesmen in 1867 to give the Dominion complete control over relations between the 
federal Crown and its employees.”
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relied on in Lefebvre, is not completely clear on which doctrine is being 
applied and does not explicitly use the term “interjurisdictional immunity.” 
The Court in St Hubert Base held that Quebec labour legislation “has 
no application” to an association of teachers on a military base.69 It also 
described this proposition as stating that “the federal Crown cannot 
be subject to provincial statutes regulating labour relations.”70 These 
statements are consistent with interjurisdictional immunity, although 
they could also re ect federal Crown immunity to provincial statutes. 
Moreover, the court in St Hubert Base does not identify federal legislation 
that would prevail over the provincial legislation,71 and thus paramountcy 
seems inapplicable. However, unlike Reference re Minimum Wage Act, the 
Supreme Court of Canada has not in subsequent cases explicitly clari ed 
which doctrine was applied in St Hubert Base.
Justice Martineau’s reasoning in Hardy appears to have two connected 
arguments. The  rst argument, which is not necessarily a constitutional 
argument, is that the provincial legislation in question does not “bind” 
the federal Crown.72 For the purposes of this argument it is suf cient to 
note  rst that Krieger must mean that the provincial Crown and provincial 
government lawyers are bound by necessary implication by provincial 
legislation on the legal profession,73 and second Hogg’s argument that a 
provincial law that binds the provincial Crown will also bind the federal 
Crown, at least as a matter of statutory interpretation.74 Justice Martineau 
may also be invoking the constitutional doctrine of federal Crown 
immunity from provincial legislation.
Justice Martineau’s second argument in Hardy, which is unquestionably 
a constitutional one, is that provincial legislation cannot affect the federal 
government’s power to select its employees. The precise nature of this 
constitutional argument is unclear. Where he refers to other federal 
legislation that governs these matters, it looks like paramountcy—but 
elsewhere it looks more like interjurisdictional immunity.75
69. St Hubert Base, supra note 66 at 503.
70. Ibid at 507.
71. The school was authorized by an Order in Council under the National Defence Act, RSC 1970, 
c N-4 (St Hubert Base, supra note 66 at 499-500), but there was otherwise no mention of federal 
legislation that applied to the teachers.
72. See above note 64: “la Couronne Fédérale n’est pas liée.”
73. Martin, “Attorney General Immunity,” supra note 2 at 425-426. 
74. Hogg, supra note 19, ch 10 at 10.9 (a), (b), (c), (d), pages 10-18 to 10-21.
75. See above note 65: “Soumettre l’exercice de tel pouvoir à une legislation provinciale constituerait 
une intrusion qui aurait comme effet, de priver l’autorité fédérale de l’une de ses compétences 
essentielles.”
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Indeed, Lefebvre and Hardy are both imprecise about which federalism 
doctrine they are applying, interjurisdictional immunity or paramountcy or 
federal Crown immunity. The more likely is interjurisdictional immunity: 
insofar as they purport to apply to federal government employees, the 
statutes on regulated professions encroach on the protected core of the 
federal head of power over federal government employees in section 
91(8) of the Constitution Act, 1867, and so are inapplicable. 76 (Here the 
federal government is the entity whose affairs are impacted by the law, 
as well as the lawmaker whose head of power is affected by the law—
collapsing  or defusing at least in part the doctrinal disagreement over 
whether interjurisdictional immunity is really about the affected entity 
or instead is really about protecting the head of power.77) Alternatively, 
provincial legislation on regulated professions frustrates the purpose 
of federal legislation on the hiring of government employees—which 
purpose is to establish a complete set of conditions for, and restrictions 
on, such hiring—and  thus the provincial legislation is inoperative to the 
extent of the inconsistency, via the doctrine of paramountcy.78 
In the further alternative, the doctrine applied could be federal Crown 
immunity: the provincial legislation cannot bind the federal Crown. As 
mentioned above, this federal Crown immunity applies to Crown employees 
only insofar as its absence would prejudice the Crown.79 However, both 
Lefebvre and Hardy seem to suggest that the requirement to comply with 
provincial legislation on regulated professions would prejudice the Crown 
by restricting its choice and regulation of its own employees. 
Given that the Supreme Court of Canada has since Lefebvre and 
Hardy held that interjurisdictional immunity should be applied only 
after paramountcy,80 and that there is some uncertainty in the caselaw 
and literature over the application of interjurisdictional immunity,81 as 
well as uncertainty over federal Crown immunity,82 paramountcy seems 
the preferable approach. Under this approach, provincial legislation on 
76. See e.g. Canadian Western Bank, supra note 20. 
77. See e.g. Robin Elliot, “Interjurisdictional Immunity after Canadian Western Bank and Lafarge 
Canada Inc.: The Supreme Court Muddies the Doctrinal Waters—Again” (2008) 43 SCLR (2d) 433 
at 436 [Elliot, “Muddies”].
78. See e.g. Mangat, supra note 4.
79. See above note 29 and accompanying text.
80. See Canadian Western Bank, supra note 20 at para 67, as discussed e.g. in Robin Elliot, “Quebec 
(Attorney General) v Lacombe and Quebec (Attorney General) v. C.O.P.A.: Ancillary Powers, 
Interjurisdictional Immunity and “The Local Interest in Land Use Planning against the National 
Interest in a Uni ed System of Aviation Navigation” ”(2011) 55 SCLR (2d) 403 at 429 [Elliot, 
“Quebec”].
81. See e.g. Elliot, “Quebec,” ibid at 429-437.
82. See Hogg, supra note 19, ch 10 at 10.9(c),(d), pages 10-20 to 10-21.
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the regulated professions, including the legal profession, frustrates the 
purpose of federal legislation on the public service, the purpose of which 
is to fully govern the hiring and regulation of federal employees. 
Thus, Lefebvre and Hardy stand for the proposition that federal 
government employees can engage in the practice of regulated professions 
without complying with provincial legislation, unless compliance is 
required by federal legislation or as a condition of employment. As 
mentioned above, MacNair uses Lefebvre to argue that federal government 
lawyers, and speci cally legislative drafters, cannot be subject to provincial 
legislation on the legal profession.83
However, one could argue that the legal profession is special because 
of the independence of the bar. While this concept was not adopted as 
a principle of fundamental justice in Canada (Attorney General) v 
Federation of Law Societies of Canada (with Cromwell J for the majority 
instead articulating a narrower conception that he termed “commitment 
to the client’s cause”), 84 the Supreme Court of Canada has nonetheless 
clearly recognized its importance.85 The independence of the bar is 
usually understood as independence from the state, but it can also refer to 
independence from the client86—and for federal government lawyers, the 
federal government is both the state and the client at the same time. By 
tying these lawyers’ ability to practice to their employment status, arguably 
these unlicensed “lawyers” lose both independence from the government 
as client, and independence from the government as the state. However, it 
is unclear how independence of the bar would operate as a legal barrier to, 
as opposed to a policy argument against, federal government employees 
practicing law without membership in a provincial bar.
Moreover, if Lefebvre and Hardy do permit the practice of law by 
unlicensed employees of the federal government, it does not necessarily 
follow that such employees can appear in court.87 If employees of the 
83. MacNair, “Legislative Drafters,” supra note 12 at 134-135.
84. Canada (Attorney General) v Federation of Law Societies of Canada, 2015 SCC 7 at para 80, 
[2015] 1 SCR 401 [Canada v FLSC].
85. See e.g. Attorney General of Canada v Law Society of British Columbia, [1982] 2 SCR 307 at 
335-336, quoted e.g. in Canada v FLSC, supra note 84 at para 98.
86. See e.g. Alice Woolley, “Integrity in Zealousness: Comparing the Standard Conceptions of the 
Canadian and American Lawyer” (1996) 9 Can JL & Juris 61 at 87. See also e.g. R v Samra (1998), 
41 OR (3d) 434 at 447, 129 CCC (3d) 144 (CA), Rosenberg JA, quoting with approval from Arthur 
Maloney, “The Role of the Independent Bar,” in Law Society of Upper Canada, ed, Special Lectures of 
the Law Society of Upper Canada, 1979: The Abuse of Power and the Role of an Independent Judicial 
System in its Regulation and Control 49 at 61-62 (Toronto: R De Boo, 1979): “[A] lawyer must never 
allow himself to become a mere mouthpiece of his client.”
87. MacNair, “Legislative Drafters,” supra note 12 at 135 notes that legislative drafters do not 
appear in court.
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federal government are immune to provincial legislation on the legal 
profession, and can practice without being bound by that legislation, it 
follows not only that such employees are immune from the jurisdiction 
of the corresponding law society but also that they are not of cers of the 
court and are not bound by obligations to the court.88 How, then, should 
courts respond to the appearance of such a person? It is trite law that courts 
have the inherent jurisdiction to control their own process. Within this 
inherent jurisdiction lies the discretion of courts to refuse appearances not 
only by non-lawyers,89 but also by lawyers: “[i]t is within the inherent 
jurisdiction of a superior court to deny the right of audience to counsel 
when the interests of justice so require.”90 (The Supreme Court of Canada 
in United States of America v Shulman was explicit that all courts 
possess this inherent jurisdiction to control their own processes.91) Thus, 
courts can—and  perhaps should—deny  the right of appearance to such 
unlicensed employees.92
What about the federal Minister of Justice and Attorney General, 
which comprised two of the three examples I gave in the introduction? 
For similar reasons as federal government employees, the federal Minister 
of Justice and Attorney General can practice law without being licensed. 
As section 91(8) refers to “Of cers of the Government of Canada,” and 
not merely employees, this head of power should include Ministers.93 The 
Attorney General is an of cer of the Crown (indeed the chief legal of cer), 
and it would be troublingly inconsistent for Ministers (at least the Minister 
of Justice) to not be.94
If we accept that Lefebvre and Hardy allow the unlicensed practice 
of law by employees of the federal government (and the federal Minister 
of Justice and Attorney General), the implications are signi cant but not 
dire. There is good reason to suspect that the federal government would 
88. See e.g. BC Act, supra note 5, s 14(2); Ontario Act, supra note 5, s 29.
89. Romanowicz, supra note 39.
90. Everingham v Ontario (1992), 8 OR (3d) 121 at 126, 88 DLR (4th) 755 (Div Ct).
91. 2001 SCC 21 at para 33, [2001] 1 SCR 616 [emphasis added]: “Not only is the Court of Appeal 
a forum of original jurisdiction for Charter purposes under the Extradition Act as a result of the 1992 
amendments, but it also has, like all courts, an implied, if not inherent, jurisdiction to control its own 
process, including through the application of the common law doctrine of abuse of process.”
92. This would also be a reasonable response by courts to any provincial legislation purporting to 
allow government employees to practice law without being lawyers.
93. Alternately it could be the peace, order, and good government power. See below note 120 and 
accompanying text.
94. See also Karen Horsman & Gareth Morley, eds, Government Liability Law and Practice 
(Toronto: Thomson Reuters Canada, 2017) (loose-leaf release no 32, June 2019), ch 1 at 1.50.20(1), 
page 1-46.5. noting that although Ministers are traditionally not employees at common law, they are 
now considered part of the Crown.
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require, as a condition of employment, its lawyers to be licensed and in 
good standing with at least one law society, as a cost-effective way of 
ensuring basic competence.95 However, for purposes of mobility, one can 
imagine the federal government not wanting its lawyers to be required to 
re-license every time they changed provinces—under  this approach, the 
federal government might require its lawyers to be licensed only in any 
one province, and not necessarily the province in which they carry out 
their duties at any given time. Consider, for example, a federal government 
litigator practicing in Halifax who is transferred to Ottawa. There may 
be good reason to allow her to practice without an Ontario license if she 
retains her Nova Scotia license. Indeed, Parliament could encourage public 
con dence by inserting a provision in federal human resources legislation 
that requires employees practicing a profession to be licensed in at least 
one province or territory. The spectre of an army of completely unlicensed 
federal government “lawyers” is thus unrealistic. Moreover, case law 
already provides that the Minister of Justice and Attorney General need 
not be a lawyer,96 and so this conclusion from federalism does not change 
the law in this respect, it merely reinforces it at the federal level.
2. But any federal government lawyers who happen to be licensed by a 
law society may be disciplined by that law society
While Krieger may appear to contradict my  rst proposition—that  federal 
government employees may practice law without being licensed by a 
law society, absent a federally-imposed requirement to the contrary—it 
does not. Instead, Krieger supports my second proposition: any federal 
government lawyers who happen to be licensed by a law society may be 
disciplined by that law society.
As mentioned above, the Supreme Court of Canada in Krieger 
noted in obiter that provincial law societies have the same disciplinary 
jurisdiction over federal Crown prosecutors as they do over provincial 
Crown prosecutors. However, this observation relied on the fact that 
federal Crown prosecutors were members of the corresponding provincial 
law society:
95. Indeed, the Department of Justice currently requires that applicants for counsel positions 
hold “[m]embership in good standing in a Law Society of one of the Provinces or Territories of 
Canada.” See e.g. GC Jobs, online: <https://emploisfp-psjobs.cfp-psc.gc.ca/psrs-srfp/applicant/
page1800?poster=1319530> [https://perma.cc/4SJX-F7FM]. See also McNair, “Silk,” supra note 11 
at 140.
96. Askin v Law Society of British Columbia, 2013 BCCA 233, 363 DLR (4th) 706, leave to appeal 
to SCC refused, 35463 (7 November 2013).
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As members of their respective law societies, federal Crown prosecutors 
are subject to the same ethical obligations as all other members of the bar 
and not immune to discipline for dishonest or bad faith conduct. 97
The Court took this membership as a given, and did not specify where the 
requirement for membership came from. The holding itself in Krieger—
that provincial law societies have disciplinary jurisdiction over provincial 
Crown prosecutors for all conduct other than matters of prosecutorial 
discretion98—likewise relied on the fact that provincial Crown prosecutors 
were required to be members of the corresponding law society. The Court 
noted that:
To be a Crown prosecutor in Alberta, there are two requirements: (1) 
employment as such by the Attorney General’s of ce and (2) membership 
in the Law Society of Alberta. To keep his or her job, a Crown prosecutor 
must perform to the standards of the employer, the Attorney General’s 
of ce, and must remain in good standing by complying with the ethical 
requirements of the Law Society. All Alberta lawyers are subject to the 
rules of the Law Society—Crown prosecutors are no exception. 99
However, as it did with federal Crown prosecutors, the Court took the 
requirement of membership in the Law Society as a given for provincial 
Crown prosecutors, and did not specify where that requirement came from. 
Presumably, membership was a requirement because Crown prosecutors’ 
duties included the practice of law, and provincial legislation on the legal 
profession permits practice only by members of the law society. Thus, 
Krieger does not—in itself—hold that federal government employees 
must be members of the law society to practice law. 
It is important to emphasize here that the Lefebvre and Hardy line of 
cases is not inconsistent with my interpretation of the obiter in Krieger. 
Krieger states that federal prosecutors are subject to law society discipline 
if they are members of the law society. It turns out, following Lefebvre 
and Hardy, that federal government lawyers need not be members of a law 
society.
Here I note that, even if federal Crown immunity indeed applies to 
federal government lawyers as Crown employees, by joining a provincial 
law society under provincial legislation on the legal profession, they are 
agreeing to be bound by that legislation and subject to the regulatory 
authority of that law society.100 This point is similar to that made in Breton 
97. Krieger, supra note 4 at para 56 [emphasis added].
98. Ibid at para 60.
99. Ibid at para 41.
100. See above note 25 and accompanying text on the limitations of federal Crown immunity.
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c Comité de discipline de l’Ordre professionnel des travailleurs sociaux 
du Québec, in which a social worker in the Canadian Forces had registered 
with the Order not because he was required to but in order to have the right 
to practice after he had left the Forces:101
En agissant ainsi, il a choisi de s’assujettir à la discipline de l’Ordre 
et, conséquemment, aux normes déontologiques que celui-ci détermine 
pour ses membres…. L’adhésion à un ordre professionnel confère des 
privilèges mais elle entraîne, également, des obligations; on ne peut se 
réclamer des droits et prétendre se soustraire aux devoirs.102
Justice Otis is explicit that one cannot voluntarily come under the 
jurisdiction of a professional regulator for some purposes but not others.103
Like the social worker in Breton, federal government lawyers are not 
required to join a law society, but any lawyer who chooses to do so must 
accept the obligations that come along with that membership.
Thus, my  rst proposition—that federal government “lawyers” may 
practice law without being licensed by a law society, absent a federally-
imposed requirement to the contrary—is quali ed by my second 
proposition: that any federal government lawyers who happen to be 
licensed by a law society may be disciplined by that law society.
 A wrinkle: The Ontario Barristers Act and federal Attorneys General
Before proceeding to my third proposition, I pause to note a caveat to my 
second proposition. While any federal government lawyers who happen 
to be licensed by a law society may be disciplined by that law society, 
there may be an exception for federal Attorneys General called under 
the Ontario Barristers Act. 104 This provision essentially provides that a 
federal Attorney General is entitled, purely by virtue of being appointed 
the federal Attorney General, to be called to the Ontario bar:
101. Breton, supra note 29 at para 20: “il s’était inscrit à l’Ordre a n d’avoir le droit d’exercer sa 
profession après avoir quitté les Forces.”
102. Ibid at paras 19, 20 [citation omitted].  An unof cial translation is as follows: “In doing so, 
he chose to submit to the discipline of the Order and, consequently, to the ethical standards that it 
determines for its members…. Membership in a professional order confers privileges, but it also 
entails obligations; we cannot claim rights and pretend to evade duties.”
103. Ibid at para 20: “On ne peut s’inscrire au tableau d’un ordre professionnel à la seule  n d’assurer 
la validité de son permis d’exercice professionnel.” An unof cial translation is as follows: “You 
cannot register on the roll of a professional order for the sole purpose of ensuring the validity of your 
professional license.”
104. Barristers Act, RSO 1990, c B.3. For example, Jody Wilson-Raybould was called under that 
provision: Elizabeth Thompson, “Can Wilson-Raybould claim solicitor–client privilege over SNC-
Lavalin?” CBC News (21 February 2019), online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/wilson-
raybould-lawyer-law-society-1.5027143> [https://perma.cc/7H8M-3Y7Q].
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A person who is or has been Minister of Justice and Attorney General 
of Canada or Solicitor General of Canada is entitled to be called to the 
bar of Ontario without complying with the Law Society Act or any of the 
regulations or rules of the Society as to licensing, examinations, payment 
of fees or otherwise, and is thereupon entitled to practise at the bar of Her 
Majesty’s courts in Ontario.105
This provision dates back to 1891 and remains virtually unchanged.106 It 
has not been considered in any reported case. 
The manner in which this provision is drafted potentially creates 
uncertainty over whether the Law Society of Ontario has regulatory and 
disciplinary jurisdiction over such a lawyer. The provision does not require 
compliance “with the Law Society Act or any of the regulations or rules of 
the Society as to licensing, examinations, payment of fees or otherwise” 
and grants an “entitlement” to practice in Ontario. The compliance that 
is waived appears to be compliance with the conditions for entry to the 
profession, i.e. to be called to the bar of Ontario. Thus, for example, a federal 
Attorney General would not be subject to any assessment or proceedings 
related to her good character. However, the addition of the “entitlement” 
clause suggests that she could not face any restriction or suspension based 
on disciplinary grounds (including competency grounds).
3. And Parliament can immunize federal government lawyers from law 
society discipline
So far in this part I have argued that (1) federal government “lawyers” can 
practice law without being licensed by any law society, absent a federally-
imposed requirement to the contrary, but (2) any federal government 
lawyers who happen to be licensed by a law society may be disciplined 
by that law society. My third proposition, which quali es the second 
proposition, is that Parliament can immunize federal government lawyers 
from law society discipline. So long as there is a valid federal head of 
power under which these immunity provisions  t, they would prevail over 
provincial legislation on the legal profession via paramountcy.
Why would disciplinary immunity be desirable? As mentioned above, 
many if not most lawyers for the federal government will be licensed in 
105. Barristers Act, supra note 104, s 1.
106. Jeanette Bosschart, “Lawyers and Lawmakers: A Statutory History of The Law Society Act, The 
Barristers Act and The Solicitors Act, 1785–1993” (1994) 28 [LSUC] Gazette 171 at 187. See An Act 
to amend the law as to Barristers and Solicitors in certain cases, SO 1891, c 35, s 1: “Any person who 
is, has been, or shall be, Minister of Justice of Canada, if not already a member of the bar of Ontario, 
shall be entitled to be called to the bar by the benchers of the Law Society of Upper Canada without 
complying with any of the rules or regulations of the society as to admission on the books of the 
society, examinations, payment of fees or otherwise, and shall thereupon be entitled to practice at the 
bar in Her Majesty’s Courts in Ontario.”
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at least one jurisdiction, and Parliament would be wise to require such 
licensing. However, disciplinary immunity may nonetheless be desirable. 
Here we can recycle the classic argument against civil liability as applied, 
for example, recently in the context of disciplinary liability in Groia v Law 
Society of Upper Canada. 107 Arguably, the prospect of law society discipline 
deters or chills lawyers from providing effective services, via the lens of 
resolute advocacy, or otherwise. More speci cally, Crown prosecutors 
and the Attorney General make dif cult and controversial decisions on a 
regular basis. (In response, one would admittedly note that many of those 
decisions are already protected under prosecutorial discretion following 
Krieger.) In civil litigation, particularly constitutional litigation, counsel 
may also take unpopular positions and make controversial decisions. They 
would seem to have a similar need as Crown prosecutors for disciplinary 
immunity.
I will consider three groups for which Parliament may seek to provide 
disciplinary immunity: federal Crown prosecutors, all federal government 
lawyers (including federal Crown prosecutors), and the federal Attorney 
General.
Following Krieger, Crown prosecutors comprise a likely group that 
Parliament may wish to grant immunity from law society discipline. Here 
the relevant federal head of power would be criminal law and procedure 
under section 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 1867. Thus, the most intuitive 
legislative vehicle for such an immunity provision would be the Criminal 
Code. Parliament could also immunize the Attorney General, as a matter 
of criminal law and procedure under s 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 
1867, at least for actions taken pursuant to her duties and powers under 
the Criminal Code. (I return to the scope of immunity below.) Indeed, it 
would appear that Parliament could immunize both federal and provincial 
prosecutors, and federal and provincial Attorneys General, under this head 
of power.108 The reasons to immunize federal prosecutors and the federal 
Attorney General would presumably apply equally to the immunization of 
provincial prosecutors and the provincial Attorney General.
107. Groia v Law Society of Upper Canada, 2018 SCC 27, e.g. at para 76, [2018] 1 SCR 772: 
“Nevertheless, when de ning incivility and assessing whether a lawyer’s behaviour crosses the line, 
care must be taken to set a suf ciently high threshold that will not chill the kind of fearless advocacy 
that is at times necessary to advance a client’s cause. The Appeal Panel recognized the need to develop 
an approach that would avoid such a chilling effect.” For a forceful rejection of the chilling effect of 
civil liability, see e.g. Hill v Hamilton Wentworth Regional Police Services Board (2005), 76 OR (3d) 
481 at para 63, 259 DLR (4th) 676 (CA), MacPherson JA, aff’d (albeit a little less forcefully) 2007 
SCC 41, [2007] 3 SCR 129.
108. Such provisions, if they were inconsistent with provincial law, would prevail via paramountcy.
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Alternately, Parliament could immunize federal Crown prosecutors 
only, and/or all federal government lawyers and/or the federal Attorney 
General, under the head of power in section 91(8) (federal government 
employees) of the Constitution Act, 1867. This immunity provision could 
be added to the Department of Justice Act and the Director of Public 
Prosecutions Act, 109 or perhaps to the Public Service Employment Act.110
Whichever approach is taken, the scope of the immunity provision(s) 
must also be chosen. As an example, the provision of the Ontario Law 
Society Act immunizing the Attorney General de nes the scope of this 
immunity: “No person who is or has been the Attorney General for 
Ontario is subject to any proceedings of the Society or to any penalty 
imposed under this Act for anything done by him or her while exercising 
the functions of such of ce.”111 The original language in the bill that added 
this provision granted immunity “for anything done by him while in such 
of ce.”112 Presumably the former version, which preserves disciplinary 
liability for extraprofessional conduct, would be preferable. The scope 
may also be limited by the head of power used, which would be re ected 
in the legislative vehicle chosen. For example, an immunity provision for 
the Attorney General in the Criminal Code would presumably, whether 
explicitly in its text or implicitly, cover only conduct related to her 
functions under the Criminal Code and related legislation.
I also note here the importance of precise language for the federal 
Attorney General, who is also the Minister of Justice.113 As federal 
legislation usually distinguishes between the two roles, referring to one 
and not the other, legislators should turn their minds to whether they wish 
to immunize activity in both roles or in one only. An immunity provision 
should explicitly refer to both roles if the intention is comprehensive 
immunity.
I acknowledge that, at  rst glance, the reasons and powers for granting 
immunity to federal Ministers, including the Minister of Justice and 
Attorney General, might appear to be somewhat different than the reasons 
for granting immunity to federal government lawyers. A primary concern 
for Ministers would be that the law society regulatory discipline process, 
109. Department of Justice Act, RSC 1985, c J-2; Director of Public Prosecutions Act [DPPA], 
enacted by s 121 of Federal Accountability Act, SC 2006, c 9.
110. Public Service Employment Act, Part 7, ss 111-22 [PSEA], being Part 3 of the Public Service 
Modernization Act, ss 12-13, SC 2003, c 22.
111. Law Society Act, supra note 5, s 13 [emphasis added].
112. Martin, “Attorney General Immunity,” supra note 2 at 437 [emphasis added].
113. Department of Justice Act, supra note 109, s 2(2): “The Minister [of Justice] is ex of cio Her 
Majesty’s Attorney General of Canada, holds of ce during pleasure and has the management and 
direction of the Department.”
The Implications of Federalism for the Regulation 389
of Federal Government Lawyers
and particularly complaints, could be used as a political weapon.114 While 
the Attorney General’s non-partisan role should arguably prevail over his 
or her political role,115 the Attorney General is indisputably a politician.116
With respect to the Attorney General in particular, given the Attorney 
General’s many discretionary and controversial functions, similar chilling 
effect concerns would apply as to Crown prosecutors and other government 
lawyers.117 For these reasons, it may actually be more important to grant 
disciplinary immunity to Ministers than to grant such immunity to federal 
government lawyers. While Ministers are undoubtedly of cers and not 
employees, they are nonetheless part of the federal Crown under section 
91(8) and so it would be within federal power to immunize them from law 
society discipline.118
Thus the implications of federalism for the regulation of lawyers 
for the federal government can be summarized as follows:  (1) federal 
government “lawyers” can practice law without being licensed by any law 
society, absent a federally-imposed requirement to the contrary, but (2) any 
federal government lawyers who happen to be licensed by a law society 
may be disciplined by that law society, and (3) Parliament can immunize 
federal government lawyers from law society discipline.
One method and reason to exempt federal government lawyers from 
provincial law society jurisdiction would be to create a parallel regulatory 
system for federal government lawyers, following Sanderson’s suggestion. 
I turn to this possibility in the next part.
III. A federal government bar?
I have argued above that, while federal government lawyers are not 
required to be licensed by any law society, Parliament would be wise to 
require them to be licensed by at least one law society to ensure basic 
competency and promote public con dence. 
Another option would be to create a unique federal licensing and 
regulatory scheme for federal government lawyers—a federal government 
bar, in effect. Sanderson has intriguingly suggested that Parliament could 
create a separate code of conduct and “over-sight regim[e]” for federal 
government lawyers that would “ous[t] provincial jurisdiction.” 119
114. See e.g. Martin, “Lawyer-Politicians,” supra note 2 at 23-26.
115. See e.g. The Honourable Ian Scott, “Law, Policy, and the Role of the Attorney General: 
Constancy and Change in the 1980s” (1989) 39:2 UTLJ 109 at 122.
116. See e.g. Krieger, supra note 4 at para 29. 
117. See e.g. Martin, “Attorney General Immunity,” supra note 2 at 441-442.
118. Alternatively, authority over Ministers could be located in the peace, order, and good government 
power. See below notes 120 to 122 and accompanying text.
119. Sanderson, supra note 2 at 3-5 [quotes are from 3 and 4].
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(Sanderson relies on Mangat, discussed above.) While Sanderson does not 
go into detail as to what such a regime might entail, here I interpret that 
idea as meaning a separate federal government bar. Indeed, this would be a 
compelling reason to allow federal government employees to practice law 
without belonging to a provincial or territorial bar.  In this part I consider 
whether this approach is indeed within the jurisdiction of Parliament and 
what some of the advantages and disadvantages of this approach would be.
The idea of a separate federal government bar, while creative, appears to 
be soundly supported by federalism doctrine and particularly the precedent 
of Mangat combined with Lefebvre and Hardy. Legislation establishing 
such a federal regulatory regime would prevail, via paramountcy, over 
provincial legislation on the legal profession. Sanderson does not specify 
which federal head of power would apply. However, for the reasons 
discussed above, the most likely head of federal power would be subsection 
91(8) of the Constitution Act, 1867. In the alternative, Parliament could 
use the national concern branch of its peace, order, and good government 
power. 120 A federal government bar appears to meet the requirements 
af rmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Hydro-Québec:
For a matter to qualify as a matter of national concern in either sense 
it must have a singleness, distinctiveness and indivisibility that clearly 
distinguishes it from matters of provincial concern and a scale of impact 
on provincial jurisdiction that is reconcilable with the fundamental 
distribution of legislative power under the Constitution;
In determining whether a matter has attained the required degree of 
singleness, distinctiveness and indivisibility that clearly distinguishes it 
from matters of provincial concern it is relevant to consider what would 
be the effect on extra-provincial interests of a provincial failure to deal 
effectively with the control or regulation of the intra-provincial aspects 
of the matter.121
The regulation of federal government lawyers appears to have a suf cient 
singleness and indivisibility to qualify, as well as a relatively minor impact 
on provincial jurisdiction over the practice of law. However, it is unclear 
whether it has suf cient distinctiveness from the regulation of the rest of 
the legal profession and whether there is a suf cient effect of a provincial 
failure to address the intra-provincial aspects. 122 Whether under subsection 
91(8) or the peace, order, and good government power, such legislation 
would prevail so long as the purpose of the legislation was clearly to 
120. See e.g. R v Hydro-Québec, [1997] 3 SCR 213, 151 DLR (4th) 32 [Hydro-Québec cited to SCR].
121. Hydro-Québec, ibid at para 65, Lamer CJ and Iacobucci J dissenting but not on this point.
122. See e.g. ibid.
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establish a complete regulatory scheme for federal government lawyers—
i.e., to replace and not to supplement provincial regulatory regimes. Such 
a regime could nevertheless incorporate, by reference, provincial codes of 
conduct.123 
The creation of a single federal regime would promote not just 
mobility but also consistency and expertise. The Crown in right of Canada 
is a single employer and single client with lawyers spread across thirteen 
jurisdictions. While the Federation of Law Societies of Canada and its 
initiatives promote consistency, there are limits to that work.124 Similarly, 
the national mobility agreement provides only short-term mobility. The 
federal government might prefer a single regime, which would facilitate 
and simplify regulatory compliance as well as promote mobility. Such a 
single regime would also accumulate and develop expertise in the unique 
aspects of government lawyering. Commentators have emphasized that 
government lawyering is different from private practice and that the rules 
of professional conduct and some of the major regulatory concerns of the 
provincial and territorial law societies simply do not apply to lawyers 
for the government.125 For example, Adam Dodek notes that government 
lawyers do not engage in advertising or marketing or hold client funds in 
trust accounts, and thus “whole chapters in the applicable codes of conduct 
are absolutely irrelevant to government lawyers.”126 Moreover, federal 
government lawyers, to some extent like other lawyers for organizations, 
face particular pressures—especially “client capture”—to which such a 
regime could pay particular attention.127 Another bene t would be that 
government lawyers would almost by de nition no longer be under-
123. Sanderson, supra note 2 at 4.
124. See for example Federation of Law Societies of Canada, Model Code of Professional Conduct 
(Ottawa: FLSC, 2009, as amended 19 October 2019), online: Federation of Law Societies of Canada 
<https:// sc.ca/resources/> [https://perma.cc/FY6X-KFHF] [FLSC Model Code]. While the Model 
Code has promoted uniformity, and most provincial and territorial codes of conduct mostly follow the 
Model Code, some degree of variation persists.
125. See e.g. Dodek, supra note 1 at 4-5: “government lawyers and the work they do are largely 
ignored. They are barely acknowledged in codes of conduct, underrepresented in law societies and 
undertheorized in academic scholarship.” See also e.g. Allan C Hutchinson, “‘In the Public Interest’: 
The Responsibilities and Rights of Government Lawyers” (2008) 46 Osgoode Hall LJ 105 at 106: “Not 
only do the various of cial codes of professional conduct remain almost silent in their applicability to 
government lawyers, there is also a paucity of academic literature and professional commentary about 
how these lawyers are supposed to approach their working obligations and institutional imperatives. 
Yet this default approach…fails to recognize that the ethical duties and professional obligations 
imposed on private lawyers do not transfer easily or usefully to the different context of government 
lawyers.”
126. Dodek, supra note 1 at 11.
127. Ibid at 11, 13-15 (on “client capture”). 
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represented as benchers in such a federal government bar.128 This kind 
of specialized regulator would be able to focus all of its resources and 
regulatory attention on government lawyers, perhaps making it more likely 
that proactive regulation would be effective while wrongdoing would lead 
to disciplinary consequences.129 As discussed above, there may also be a 
concern that disciplinary liability has a chilling effect on resolute advocacy 
by federal government lawyers.130 Regulation by a federal government 
bar that better understands the dimensions and realities of government 
lawyering would counteract in part that purported chilling effect.
Such a regime could include the Minister of Justice and Attorney 
General, and potentially lawyer-politicians. If so, the regime would 
have the opportunity to develop special expertise and appreciation of the 
tensions Ministers face between their responsibilities as lawyers and their 
roles as politicians.131
Moreover, such a regime could provide that federal government 
lawyers are of cers of all Canadian courts. This would af rm that they 
have obligations to the court and so reduce, and perhaps eliminate, the 
likelihood that courts would refuse them appearance rights because they 
are not members of the corresponding provincial law society.
On the other hand, there may be suspicion among the bench and bar, 
if not among the general public, that such a regulatory apparatus would 
be overly lenient to its members. There would need to be clear separation 
between the new regulator and the federal government in order to protect 
the independence of the bar, in both reality and appearance. Such a regime 
would also require an extensive bureaucratic infrastructure—however, 
given the number of federal government lawyers, ef ciencies of scale may 
well make such a regime more cost-effective than at least the smaller law 
societies.
Federal government lawyers may also  nd that a federal government 
bar limits their career mobility and prospects. It is not clear how receptive 
provincial law societies would be to the transfer and call of such lawyers 
into provincial bars. Furthermore, the Constitution Act, 1867 would 
128. Ibid at 4-5.
129. See e.g. ibid at 12, note 40: “the Crown qua client is unlikely to complain to the law society. 
Representatives of the Crown, speci cally, senior government lawyers, are likely to take revelations 
of misconduct by lawyers under their supervision very seriously and may encourage lawyers to self-
report to the law society or failing that, report the lawyer directly to the relevant law society.”
130. See above note 107 and accompanying text. 
131. See generally Martin, “Lawyer-Politicians,” supra note 2.
The Implications of Federalism for the Regulation 393
of Federal Government Lawyers
preclude appointment of members of a federal government bar instead of 
a provincial bar as section 96 judges.132
While Sanderson does not identify the speci c form that such a federal 
regime could or would take, the principle of the independence of the bar 
would suggest a form that tracks closely to the provincial law societies—
if for no other reason, so that federal government lawyers could not 
reasonably be criticized for lacking the independence from the client and 
employer that their provincial counterparts enjoy. A federal government 
law society could be governed by benchers primarily elected from the 
various provinces and territories, with some non-lawyers appointed by the 
Governor in Council and some lawyers (such as the Minister of Justice 
and Attorney General) as ex of cio benchers. Such a bar should be arms-
length from the federal government in a similar way as the provincial 
bars are arms-length from the provincial government. Indeed, the fact 
that such a federal bar was composed solely of lawyers for the federal 
government would make it more important, not less important, that there 
be independence from the government as employer-client.
At minimum, for Parliament to require federal government lawyers 
to belong to Sanderson’s federal government bar would be preferable to 
the current state of the law, in which federal government employees can 
practice law without being licensed. The simpler, though not necessarily 
more cost-effective, alternative would be for Parliament to adopt legislation 
requiring government lawyers to belong to at least one provincial or 
territorial law society.
Thus, while Sanderson characterizes her proposal as “simply a matter 
of possibly, constitutional theory, far from a likely policy choice at this 
point,”133 it does have considerable advantages and warrants serious 
consideration.
A federal bar could potentially extend even further than Sanderson 
suggests, to include not only lawyers for the federal government but any 
and all lawyers who serve federally-regulated entities such as banks and 
airlines.134 (Such a regime would necessarily rely on the other heads of 
power in section 91 and not merely section 91(8).) While beyond the 
132. Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 4, s 97 [emphasis added]: “Until the Laws relative to Property 
and Civil Rights in Ontario, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, and the Procedure of the Courts in 
those Provinces, are made uniform, the Judges of the Courts of those Provinces appointed by the 
Governor General shall be selected from the respective Bars of those Provinces.” Section 98: “The 
Judges of the Courts of Quebec shall be selected from the Bar of that Province.” [Emphasis added.] I 
thank a reviewer for this suggestion.
133. Sanderson, supra note 2 at 5.
134. I thank a reviewer for this suggestion.
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scope of this article, this is nonetheless a possibility which merits further 
consideration. 
Conclusion
In this article, I have assessed the implications of federalism for the 
regulation of federal government lawyers. I have argued that federal 
government employees cannot be required by provincial legislation to 
be licensed by a law society in order to practice law; that, nonetheless, 
any such lawyers who are so licensed are subject to the regulatory and 
disciplinary jurisdiction of those law societies; and that Parliament can pass 
legislation immunizing federal government lawyers from such discipline. 
I have also considered the feasibility, advantages, and disadvantages of 
a separate federal government bar and concluded that the idea warrants 
serious consideration.
To return to the questions I posed in the introduction, all three lawyers 
could potentially face discipline because all three were members of a 
provincial law society at the time of the impugned conduct.135 However, 
Parliament could pass legislation immunizing similarly situated lawyers—
as a class—from  that discipline in the future.136
The focus of this article has been on law, and while legal considerations 
are important they should not be allowed to eclipse policy considerations. 
Questions of law society regulatory jurisdiction over lawyers—and the 
ability of Parliament and the legislatures to interfere with that regulatory 
jurisdiction, including discipline—go to the heart of administrative law 
generally, and legal ethics and professionalism speci cally. Ultimately, 
this article is a reminder to re ect on the overriding purpose of law society 
regulatory and disciplinary jurisdiction: to protect the public interest.137
Indeed, the Supreme Court of Canada in Krieger held that law societies 
must have disciplinary jurisdiction over Crown prosecutors because their 
disciplinary powers are uniquely able to protect the public:
A prosecutor whose conduct so contravenes professional ethical 
standards that the public would be best served by preventing him or 
her from practising law in any capacity in the province should not be 
immune from disbarment. Only the Law Society can protect the public 
in this way.138
135. Subject to my caveat about the third lawyer, the Attorney General called to the bar of Ontario 
under the Barristers Act, supra note 104. 
136. More controversially, Parliament could explicitly make that immunity retroactive.
137. See e.g. Law Society Act, supra note 5, s 4.2, para 3: “The Society has a duty to protect the public 
interest.”
138. Krieger, supra note 4 at para 58.
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This statement applies beyond prosecutors to all government lawyers, 
whether federal or provincial. To interfere with this disciplinary 
jurisdiction is ultimately to erode the protection of the public interest. Any 
legislated derogations from this disciplinary jurisdiction, though legally 
and constitutionally permissible, should be adopted sparingly. For this 
reason, Parliament would be wise to provide in federal legislation that all 
federal government lawyers must be licensed by at least one Canadian law 
society. Sanderson’s proposal—under which federal government lawyers 
would be licensed and regulated by a separate federal regulatory regime—
is a more radical approach but nonetheless warrants careful consideration.
